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 Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou 
The 2003 Hellenic Presidency of the 
European Union 
Mediterranean Perspectives on the ESDP 
Introduction 
The terrorist attacks against the US on September 11
th, 2001, have ushered 
in a new era in international politics. The priorities of international rela-
tions, the nature of regional politics, the shape of political alliances, along 
with the driving purpose of US foreign policy, the nature of international 
cleavages, and the evolving role of military forces, including the risks of 
weapons of mass destruction, have all been affected by the epoch-making 
events.
1 The latter have also altered the Western strategic threshold, but 
have not really challenged, at least fundamentally, the dominant US posi-
tion in world politics, although the impact on the current US strategy de-
bate is profound. Likewise, the overall international security paradigm re-
mained reasonably clear-cut, in that the US dominates, in large measure, 
the post-Cold War international system, especially those aspects of the sys-
tem dealing with security issues. 
Against an ever more turbulent and at the same time unpredictable interna-
tional security environment, clear manifestations of which have been the 
wars in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Iraq, security and defence  
 
1  D. N. Chryssochoou, M. J. Tsinisizelis, S. Stavridis and K. Ifantis, Theory and re-
form in the European Union, second revised edition, Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2003. Dimitris K. Xenakis/ Dimitris N. Chryssochoou 
analysts were quick to point out that the Mediterranean region is particu-
larly vulnerable to the emerging global security setting. After all, it has tra-
ditionally been a zone of strategic and socio-economic instability, migra-
tion flows, violent religious and cultural conflicts, varying forms of politi-
cal institutions, differing security perceptions and, above all, divergent 
worldviews. Today, three major issues dominate Euro-Mediterranean af-
fairs: the widening socio-economic gap between the ‘booming’ but still un-
derdeveloped South and the ‘growing old’ but wealthy North; the redefini-
tion of Euro-Arab relations; and the ‘power deficit’ between the European 
Union (EU) and its southern Mediterranean partners. The latter has been 
escalating steadily since the signing of the Schengen Treaty, which many 
perceive as the forerunner of a ‘fortress’ Europe.  
Issues of Mediterranean stability are old themes in the study of interna-
tional relations, let alone of European diplomacy. Yet, they still rest on 
considerable variation. The extent to which the Mediterranean can be seen 
as a distinct region complicates further the discussion about the appropriate 
scope and level of a common European policy towards this part of the 
world. Partly as a result of the Community’s Mediterranean enlargements 
in the 1980s, and partly due to the changing conditions post-1989, Mediter-
ranean affairs have come to occupy a significant amount of Europe’s exter-
nal relations. But important questions are raised as to whether the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched in Barcelona in November 
1995, will be crowed with success; whether the EU can further political and 
economic liberalisation in the partner-states; which norms, rules and deci-
sion-making processes are likely to emerge in the security-building aspects 
of the EMP; whether a more equitable regime of economic exchange will 
be established in the region; and what the prospects of regional institution-
alisation are, given the levels of complexity, heterogeneity and fragmenta-
tion that for centuries now shape the physiognomy of the region. Added to 
the above are questions of good governance, civil society, multiculturalism 
and inter-faith dialogue. 
But Euro-Mediterranean relations are also affected by a new regional stra-
tegic variable: the EU’s nascent European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). In its present stage, this crisis-management tool directs attention to 
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a set of developments that enhance the EU’s role in international security 
affairs. Arguably though, ESDP is but one aspect of a broader and far more 
ambitious objective linked, inter alia, with the future of the EU political 
system, and particularly the elaboration of a common European defence 
policy, leading eventually to a common defence (composed of a mutual 
assistance clause and assorted solidarity provisions). Such developments 
reflect the desire of EU members to advance the pace and range of the re-
gional arrangements in the sensitive fields of security and defence.  
Ultimately, the aim is to ‘communitarise’ the EU’s second pillar – the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - so as to bestow the larger 
polity with the necessary decision-making structure for effective responses 
to actual crises. The consolidation of the CFSP is a platform from which 
the EU can make its voice heard in international affairs, adding to its - al-
ready acknowledged - economic might. The perceived ‘added value’ from 
this process of ‘deepening’ European integration, points at the formation of 
an independent political entity able to face the new global and regional 
challenges and to promote the fundamental norms of good governance. 
Such aims are to be supported by a nascent ESDP in dealing with crisis 
management operations, humanitarian and emergency rescue missions, as 
well as with peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, including peace-
enforcement; what in recent strategic parlance amounts to the so-called 
‘Petersberg tasks’. It is necessary to make clear that the ESDP, apart from 
being an incipient step towards the making of an EU military force 
‘proper’,
2 it is also a point of strategic convergence among different na-
tional aspirations, as well as a medium between the strategic preferences of 
the transatlantic partners themselves. 
The EU may well be firmly enough established as a collective polity, albeit 
with a considerable degree of ‘inventiveness’ and institutional sophistica-
 
2  In the military aspects of ESDP, the EU has committed itself to setting up a force of 
60.000 men, deployable within two months and sustained on the ground for 12 
months. But this embryonic military structure is not meant to be a standing force. 
Hence, the term ‘Euro-Army’, which has been in inflationary use for some time 
now, does not describe accurately, at least for the time being, the nature of the EU’s 
crisis-management apparatus. 
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tion, but has no historical precedent. This exacerbates the prospect of con-
textualising our expectations in relation to its global ‘actorness’ with en-
hanced military capabilities. Even though the EU’s transformation into a 
collective defence system remains a rather distant possibility, it is clear 
that, today, extraordinary opportunities arise for a substantive redefinition 
of its future international role, given that it already represents a global 
symbol of political stability and economic prosperity. To give an example, 
the EU has been actively involved in the process of democratising Central 
and Eastern Europe, as well as in the promotion of change in North Africa. 
But the vision of an EU that contributes to global security management en-
tails more than the consolidation of a regional role, especially one based on 
economic power. It requires the emergence of a commonality of interests 
among its members and, hence, a single voice in world affairs, which in 
turn implies that EU members will have to sacrifice some of the gains 
stemming from the formulation of their foreign policies on the altar of a 
defence-based CFSP. 
Doubtless, the deeper integration of EU foreign, security and defence poli-
cies is bound to affect Mediterranean governance, and with it the normative 
and institutional orientation of the EMP. For one thing, an autonomous 
European defence capability should not lead to a ‘fortress’ Europe, but 
rather, precisely because the ESDP is better equipped to dealing with crisis-
management operations, it can complement the EMP by endowing Medi-
terranean security with a more pluralist and transparent vision. Here, it is 
important for both settings to arrive at common definitions of their respec-
tive security anxieties, especially those related to asymmetrical threats, as 
well as to pertaining asymmetries in issues of justice, tolerance, informa-
tion-flow and trust-building. Thus, all strategic perceptions in the Mediter-
ranean should be reconsidered and clarified so that the EMP bears practical 
political achievements.  
Euro-Mediterranean Dynamics 
The Mediterranean is a composite of different civilisations, each reflecting 
a distinctive sense of being and belonging. But the extent to which old im-
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ages are replaced by new in the region’s cultural tapestry remains open. 
Mythical constructs aside, in the light of current constellations, the Medi-
terranean reveals a pluricausal dynamism towards a new social, cultural 
and political mapping. Elements of convergence and divergence are refor-
mulated through a dialectic of old stereotypes, novel ways of thinking, 
modified security perceptions, and an ascending pluralism in its emerging 
governance structures. Against this background, the EU agenda has been 
reshaped to accommodate regional transformations in its periphery.  
Since the launching of the EMP, the EU’s Mediterranean policy has gained 
both in strategic importance and, as compared with previous policy re-
gimes, internal cohesion. By putting an institutional face to a more bal-
anced and comprehensive approach, the EMP became key to Mediterra-
nean order-building through a principled policy orientation. Arguably, de-
velopments in the region have always been part of the EU’s agenda. 
Europe’s external relations with southern Mediterranean countries have 
become politicised as a result of the geographical proximity, the level of 
interdependence, and the role previous EU Mediterranean policies have 
come to play. Signs of an enhanced European interest were first recorded as 
early as 1975, at the beginning of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, then in the early 
and mid-1980s with the accession of Greece and the Iberian nations to the 
then Community, and again after the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf 
crisis of 1990/91. Since the mid-1990s, however, the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy has become multilateral in nature. The EMP, by forging new co-
operative policies in the region has become a focal point of attention. 
Hence a new phase of openness, dialogue and work in common from pol-
icy-design to implementation. 
Post-1989, Mediterranean security became increasingly indivisible, often 
regardless of diverse sub-regional features. More recently, some analysts 
have tried to project, both before and after September 11
th, 2001, a histori-
cal Mediterranean fragmentation, by perceiving the dominant conflict in 
the region as one between ‘occidental’ and ‘oriental’ values. This narrowly 
framed hypothesis, favours security’s cultural dimension, prophesising an 
inevitable ‘clash’ among different civilisations. Yet, others focus on ‘new’ 
security threats and risks, including international terrorism, emergent forms 
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of transnational criminalities, nuclear smuggling, drug-trafficking, uncon-
trolled refugee movements, illegal migration, socio-economic asymmetries, 
environmental risks, and the like. Since the post-bipolar world has lent 
greater fluidity and instability to the Mediterranean, what is most needed is 
a structured political dialogue on the root-causes of conflict, the prolepsis 
of immediate crises through a long-term strategy within multilateral institu-
tions, a renewed focus on institutional response adaptation, and the devel-
opment of a ‘common strategic language’ to redefine security issues. 
Here, the comparative advantage of the EU in developing an ESDP Medi-
terranean dimension is that the EMP was not meant to serve as a conflict-
manager, peacekeeper, or an instrument of conflict resolution. For all its 
ambition to bring about an ‘area of peace and stability’, the Barcelona Dec-
laration emerged as a loose framework for conflict prevention. The ESDP’s 
capacity structure is better equipped to act as an institution able to carry out 
crisis-management missions, offering complementary security framework 
for the elaboration of guidelines towards a ‘common Mediterranean secu-
rity space’. In that sense, an ESDP-led security dialogue in the region will 
bear positive cumulative effects in the EMP, opening up new possibilities 
for critical security issues to be discussed such as interoperability and ‘con-
structive duplication’, doctrinal convergence on conflict prevention, intelli-
gence-sharing and information exchange practices, export control regimes, 
civilian emergency planning and, moreover, a redefinition of defence 
mechanisms with a view to embracing civilian capabilities and achieving 
operational cohesion. Such an extended political dialogue could thus en-
hance security’s ‘human’ dimension, including civilian engagement in cri-
sis-management missions, compatibility of prescribed actions with human 
rights norms, civil society input, and so on.  
But epitomising the EMP is the emphasis put on respect for democracy and 
human rights, political dialogue, economic liberalisation, as well as finan-
cial and technical assistance for the southern Mediterranean partners. The 
Barcelona Declaration, adopted eight years ago, includes numerous norms 
on rule-governed interstate relations and global disarmament, as well as 
provisions for combating terrorism, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigra-
tion. It also provides for increased arms control-renunciation of nuclear, 
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chemical and biological weapons. Accordingly, one could argue that the 
EMP, for all its shortfalls, has infused a greater political (security) bias to 
Euro-Mediterranean relations, whilst encompassing an ambitious economic 
plan for an (industrial) Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by the year 
2010, and a ‘human dimension’ similar to that introduced by the Helsinki 
Process in 1975.
3 
The EMP may prove instrumental in fostering a new co-operative culture, 
even a new ethos, among the partner-states. For instance, interest-
convergence around economic tasks could contribute to a relaxation of ten-
sions in areas where controversy is more likely to arise, such as military 
security and human rights. It is on that premise that a more easily discerni-
ble Euro-Mediterranean regime may come into being.
4 The composite na-
ture of the EMP offers a range of opportunities for the actors’ functionalist 
expectations to reach decisions that are beneficial to systemic stability. In 
its eight years of existence, however, the EMP has not fulfilled its high am-
bitions, but has experienced significant constrains. First, it has not helped 
in the resolution of any major security problem in the region – all three 
‘baskets’ of co-operation have suffered from the proliferation of conven-
tional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, low-level investment, 
illegal immigration, violation of human rights, and the regional ‘ticking 
bomb’ called demography. Second, all the optimism that the Oslo Process 
produced in the early 1990s turned into a devastating violent cycle of suici-
dal terrorist attacks and excessive use of military force. It is lamentable that 
since the second Intifada in 2000, the EMP has failed continuously to free 
itself from the failures of the Middle East Peace Process. 
It is fair to say that the EU exhibits difficulties in dealing with Middle East 
security, in contrast to dealing with other transformative regions. Equally 
true is that it faces significant challenges as a result of the presence of the 
 
3  D. K. Xenakis, ‘The Barcelona Process in the Light of the Helsinki Paradigm: Pat-
terns of Complexity and Order-Building’, Themata: Policy and Defence, No. 18, 
Defence Analysis Institute, Athens, 2003. 
4  D. K. Xenakis, ‘From Policy to Regime: Trends in Euro-Mediterranean Govern-
ance’,  Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, Au-
tumn/Winter1999, pp. 254-70. 
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US and the latter’s continuing reluctance to share its ‘co-operative hegem-
ony’ in the region. Post-September 11
th, the US-sponsored counter-
terrorism campaign and the recent war over Iraq highlighted the profound 
divisions not only between transatlantic partners, but also within the EMP. 
Also, the latter’s status has been seriously affected by the inadequacy of the 
EU’s intervention in the 2002 Middle East crisis, not only in terms of secu-
rity co-operation but also in relation to the Partnership’s multilateral nature. 
It is no secret that the EU has to make considerable efforts to keep Israel in 
the Peace Process, whilst continuing to co-operate with the Arab countries. 
The EU has to contribute something concretely positive to regional peace 
in accordance with the reasonable demands of its Arab partners, whilst 
dealing with Israel’s hostile attitude toward any EU-led intervention.  
Of importance in the years to come will be the chosen institutional format 
to transcend the peculiarities of a rapidly evolving Euro-Mediterranean 
space. But institutionalising the EMP alone will not be sufficient to manage 
an ever more complex and expanding security agenda. Can the EMP meet 
its prescribed ends without transforming itself from a loose association of 
states into a system of patterned behaviour with a particular notion of rules 
of the game? Put differently, can the co-operative ethos embedded in the 
Barcelona Declaration go beyond the level of contractual interstate obliga-
tions and closer to a meaningful partnership?
5 A plausible answer is that 
new rules and norms on how to handle change will have to be created, 
given that behaviour, not just proclamations, will determine the outcome of 
Mediterranean order-building. EU strategic choices will thus be of great 
importance, along with the promotion of norms of good governance, given 
the tensions arising from different conceptions of democracy and political 
liberalisation. Equally crucial are the socio-cultural barriers in promoting 
an open inter-civilisational dialogue, keeping in mind the recent re-embrace 
of religious radicalism in parts of the Arab world. Whatever the legitimis-
ing ethos of the prevailing worldviews, a structured political dialogue based 
on the principles of transparency and symbiotic association is central to the 
 
5   See further on this in D. K. Xenakis and D. N. Chryssochoou, The emerging Euro 
Mediterranean system, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 
2001. 
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cross-fertilisation of distinct politically organised and culturally defined 
units, as well as to alleviate historically rooted prejudices, whilst endowing 
the EMP with a new sense of process and purpose. 
Greece and the Mediterranean  
Greece, a country located at the eastern hub of a strategic theatre lying at 
the crossroads of three continents, is well anchored to the European zone of 
peace and stability. Being at the centre of a volatile regional triangle com-
prising Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the Medi-
terranean plays a pivotal role in the country’s history, politics and society. 
Greece is also an integral part of the Balkan state system, whilst the Ae-
gean passage constitutes an important shipping route for the transportation 
of energy products to Europe. In general, Greece’s position enhances its 
strategic significance for the EU, as the Mediterranean constitutes a crucial 
fault-line between the rich Christian North and the poor Islamic South. The 
challenges facing contemporary Greece are to safeguard its territorial integ-
rity, whilst projecting its civilian values in its oft-troubled peripheries, es-
pecially in the Balkans. With Greek politics being formulated in relation to 
an ever globalising, if not already globalised, world, the time is ripe for the 
country to redefine its identity in the new multicultural settings. 
Greece became a full member of the then European Community, now EU, 
courtesy of the Community’s first Mediterranean enlargement in the early 
1980s. Since then, the evolution of European governance has had a pro-
found impact on the country’s policy and strategic orientation, especially 
with regard to its traditional public policy domains. It is not surprising that 
an overwhelming majority of Greek public opinion has supported increas-
ingly, especially since the mid-1980s, the country’s European vocation and 
its multifarious integration into the mechanisms and institutions of the EU 
political system.
6 Although Europe remains essential to the evolution of the 
Greek polity, the latter cannot regard Europe without considering its       
nstable peripheral areas. Greece maintains good relations with most Arab  u  
6  For an evaluation of Greek-EU relations see M. J. Tsinisizelis and D. N. Chrysso-
choou, ‘Images of Greece and European Integration: A Case of Uneasy Interde-
pendence?’, Synthesis, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1996, pp. 22-33.  
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stable peripheral areas. Greece maintains good relations with most Arab 
countries and Israel, although it exhibits relatively little contact with its 
southern Mediterranean neighbors, as compared to its Balkan counterparts. 
Due mainly to traditional but also emergent security concerns, as well as to 
the centrality of religion in Greek identity, the country often orients itself 
more towards the Balkans than the Mediterranean.
7 But the emerging Euro-
Mediterranean space is now attracting greater attention from Greek foreign 
policy-makers, as it represents an embodiment of a long-standing view that 
Greece cannot be oriented towards one direction, but has to strike a balance 
between its competing identities. 
Today, Greece exhibits a firm European orientation, whilst maintaining a 
number of particular Mediterranean concerns that relate to both internal 
and external security issues. Its ‘principled’ Mediterranean policy is guided 
by respect of internationally recognised borders, stability, peace, and secu-
rity. Despite the many complex problems faced by the littoral countries, 
Greek foreign policy aims to develop multilevel and multilateral links with 
the southern EMP partners based on a rich spectrum of historical and cul-
tural ties and affinities, as well as on a long-standing common economic 
and commercial experience. Greece has intensified its efforts to foster links 
with these countries, by acting as a factor of stability throughout their – 
sometimes arduous – transitional phase of economic and political liberali-
sation. Building on an ESDP Mediterranean dimension, the new regional 
space becomes a rediscovered land of opportunity and belonging for Greek 
policy-makers. 
Greece has often found itself in a delicate position between the dictates of 
complex, if not uneasy, interdependence and the quest for independent self-
rule on sensitive national issues, especially those touching upon the ques-
tion of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It has often been ac-
cused of maintaining a fixed preoccupation with the Aegean and the Cy-
prus issue. Things have progressed, however, as the Simitis government (in 
 
7    On this issue see M. Pace, Rethinking the Mediterranean: Reality and Re-
presentation in the Creation of a Region, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 
June, 2001, especially chapter 4. 
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power since 1996) moved away from a strategy of ‘conditional sanctions’ 
to one of ‘conditional rewards’ in relation to Turkey’s EU candidancy. 
Enténte between the two countries was exhibited further after the destruc-
tive earthquakes that both countries experienced in 2000. But the causes for 
such an improvement should also be explored in close relation to the grow-
ing demands of (mainly institutional) modernization, globalization and, 
crucially, of deepening European integration. Undoubtedly, EU member-
ship implies the undertaking of certain institutional and normative obliga-
tions about the conduct of foreign policy. After the December 2002 Copen-
hagen European Council decisions and the accession of Cyprus to the EU,
8 
following the signing of the Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 May 2003, 
developments are expected to contribute positively in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean security dilemmas.
9   
Α major question in the Mediterranean is whether conflict-prone areas will 
manage to integrate into the emerging regional system. Greece has been an 
adherent of non-military solutions, with its objective in the Mediterranean 
being made clear on several occasions: to promote peaceful initiatives with 
the view to establishing a coherent framework of principles that can be 
made applicable throughout the region. This principled policy is guided by 
the rules of international legality such as respect for international borders 
and human rights. With the launching of the EMP, Greece strengthened its 
ties with its southern partners, whilst assisting in the amelioration of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The initiative of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs to organise two meetings between Palestinian and Israeli politicians, 
journalists and academics in Athens in July and December 1997 is a good 
case in point. 
 
8  See further on this in Philippos K. Savvides, ‘Cyprus at the Gate of the European 
Union: Scenarios, Challenges and Prospects’, ELIAMEP Policy Papers, No. 1, 
ELIAMEP, 2002. 
9  See further in T. Couloumbis and K. Ifantis, ‘Altering the Security Dilemma in the 
Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints - A Realist Approach’, 
The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 2002, p. 1-25. 
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The Hellenic Presidency and the ESDP 
With this in mind, let us recall that the successive crises in the Balkans dur-
ing the 1990s increased the need for developing a reliable ESDP machinery 
to support European foreign and security policy. ESDP was formally 
launched at the June 1999 Cologne European Council. Since then, it devel-
oped itself through a series of political decisions taken at Helsinki (Decem-
ber 1999), Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000), Geteborg (June 
2001), Laeken (December 2001), Seville (June 2002), Brussels (October 
2002), Copenhagen (December 2002), Athens (April 2003) and, more re-
cently, the expanded General Affairs Council (with the participation of the 
member states’ Defence Ministers) in Brussels in May 2003, where the 
European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was declared fully operational. 
Each of these decisions gave substance to the EU’s desire to enhance its 
capacity for autonomous action. 
After the Saint-Malo Agreement and the Cologne European Council, it was 
decided that the EU should achieve an autonomous capability for the de-
ployment of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in accordance with 
the UN Charter. The decisions taken at Helsinki reformed the policy frame 
and made the ESDP a reality, at least as far as the implementation process 
of the Headline Headline Goal is concerned. The Helsinki text underlined 
that the proposed action plan had to take into consideration that ‘the most 
demanding part of the missions will take place in and around the Mediter-
ranean’, without, however, separating the latter from the Balkans. The po-
litical and military institutions for EU crisis management were established 
at the December 2000 Nice European Council. Later on, at Laeken, the 
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was adopted, providing general 
guidelines for the shortfalls regarding the specifications of the ERRF. The 
so-called ‘Brussels text’, adopted by the European Council, was key in de-
veloping an ESDP ‘operational capability’, by ensuring EU autonomy be-
yond NATO’s means. Recognizing NATO’s fundamental role in European 
security, and given that it remains the sole agent for collective European 
defence, the development of EU crisis-management tools was discussed at 
14   The 2003 Hellenic Presidency of the European Union 
the Washington Summit in April 1999,
10 where it became imperative for 
both partners to reach an agreement.
11  
Finally, following the efforts of the Hellenic Presidency during the Infor-
mal Conference of EU Defence Ministers at Rethymnon on 4-5 October 
2002, the ESDP has been set on a more stable basis. The basic priority set 
out by the Presidency was the completion of all outstanding issues that 
would allow for the utilisation of the EU’s operational capability in crisis 
management operations within 2003, through the advancement of civil-
military networks. Greece has held the Presidency of the ESDP since July 
1
st, 2002 (due to Denmark’s opt-out from defence issues). In its twelve-
month Presidency, too many issues have arisen in the international agenda 
such as the intensification of the global war against terrorism, the escala-
tion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the increasing emphasis on illegal immi-
gration, and the US-led war in Iraq. Reasonable claims point to the danger 
of setting aside EU expectations to strengthen south-south co-operation 
within the EMP vis-à-vis the new security priorities. 
Most analysts, in the light of the negative experience with Eurofor and Eu-
romarfor, have underlined the need of complementary measures to support 
the ESDP. Given the low level of information about the ESDP in the Arab 
world, it the EU decided to pay greater attention to the misperceptions and 
fears of its Mediterranean partners regarding the strengthening of its mili-
tary capabilities. Thus the ESDP acquired its own Mediterranean dimen-
sion, courtesy of the initiative taken by the Spanish Presidency during the 
first half of 2002.
12 The Hellenic Presidency that followed, played a deci-
sive role to that end. Its proposals on transparency, trust-building and the 
 
10  During this Summit, the guidelines of the ESDP-NATO co-operation in the field of 
strategic management were defined so that EU operations be conducted either 
through NATO means and capabilities or independently. 
11  He means for an effective and workable ESDP-NATO relationship are not  
 in the focus of this article. Yet, such issues include, among others, the harmonisa-
tion of national defence policies and strategies, as well as of different group mem-
berships; the presently limited ESDP financial resources; and the problem of defin-
ing the weight of different groups of countries in the decision-making process. 
12  Spain plays a leading role in the EU’s Mediterranean policy. Naturally, the promo    
tion of the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dimension of the ESDP were 
high priorities for the Spanish Presidency. 
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institutionalisation of security dialogue will allow EMP partners to gain 
better access in the making of a co-operative regional space and to reduce 
the existing levels of regional asymmetry. Thus the Presidency’s seminars 
on the Mediterranean Dimension of the ESDP, held in Rhodes on 1-2 No-
vember 2002 in association with the Defence Analysis Institute of the Hel-
lenic Ministry of National Defence, and in Corfu on 9-10 May 2003, were 
meant to act as platforms for an open exchange of views to clarify EU stra-
tegic intentions and to alleviate any possible misperceptions with the view 
to promoting mutual understanding. 
In particular, at the Corfu Seminar, entitled ‘Building Security for the 
Mediterranean Peoples’, representatives of twenty-four countries were 
brought together with the view to discussing developments in ESDP and 
the use of soft security tools in the Mediterranean. The Presidency’s semi-
nar demonstrated the progress made in security- and partnership-building, 
by putting forward concrete proposals such as:
13 
 
-  Measures aimed at better understanding the specific interests and 
needs of the Mediterranean partners through a colloquium organ-
ised jointly with them to present their views on maritime security 
and the future of the EMP. 
-  Measures aimed at informing Mediterranean partners about EU 
policies, with particular reference to the ESDP. Proposals in-
cluded six monthly meetings among military personnel to dis-
cuss current developments in European defence - i.e., the fight 
against terrorism, rapid response, capabilities - and force plan-
ning. 
-  Measures aimed at promoting sub-regional initiatives in the area 
of training through seminars between EU and Mediterranean 
partners on maritime issues. 
 
13 Council of the European Union, Brussels, ‘Seminar on Building Security for the   
Mediterranean Peoples, 12 May 2003, COSDP 355. 
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-  Measures aimed at associating Mediterranean partners with EU 
activities such as participation of those interested in the planning 
and conduct of EU-led exercises. 
Implementation and further development of the above proposals rests with 
the Italian Presidency, which, to that end, organised in association with the 
Centro Minitare di Studi Strategici a follow-up Seminar on ‘Security, Sta-
bility and Co-operation in the Mediterranean Region’, held in Rome on 25 
September 2003.  In the discussions, emphasis was placed on the need for 
improving co-ordination between the EMP and NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue, in that these initiatives are complementary, rather than antagonis-
tic, to each other. There was also discussion on the text regarding the Euro-
pean Security Strategy, which is in the process of being finalised by the 
EU. Moreover, the implications stemming from EU enlargement were 
brought to the fore, together with the need for promoting confidence-
building measures that allow for the participation of Mediterranean partners 
and even for intelligence sharing on illegal immigration, proliferation of 
weapons of mass distractions, etc. 
With regard to the Hellenic Presidency of the EMP, during a particularly 
difficult period due to the escalating crisis in the Middle East and the war 
in Iraq, it set up realistic and at the same time substantive objectives for 
progress to be made in EMP matters. This is reflected in the successful out-
come of the Interim Ministerial Council that was held in Crete on 26-27 
May 2003. There, the level of attendance was quite satisfactory at ministe-
rial level, with the Presidency proposals finding their way to the Conclu-
sions. More specifically,
14 
-  A Parliamentary Assembly was set up to act as an advisory 
body, with the participation of national and European parliamen-
tarians. Such a decision bestows the EMP process with higher 
levels of legitimacy and transparency.  
-  The Declaration of Crete was adopted unanimously by the Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs. This document was prepared by the 
 
14   Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003. 
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Presidency and contained the basic guidelines for the envisaged 
inter-civiliasational dialogue. 
-  The objectives, principles and activities of the Euro-
Mediterranean Institute were agreed with the view to promoting 
further the inter-civiliasational dialogue.  
-  The role of the Civil Forum and its contribution to the EMP was 
upgraded, together with specific references on how to strengthen 
the role of women. 
The Presidency also promoted debate on important issues that will be of 
interest to EMP partners in relation to the future of Euro-Mediterranean co-
operation. That was partly the result of a wider debate on the implications 
stemming from the recent enlargement of the EU: 
-  For the first time, the future of the EMP was examined between 
the EMP partners and the new member-states, in the light of the 
policy for the ‘new neighbourhood’.  
-  Emphasis was given on the need to continue the efforts to 
strengthen political dialogue regarding CFSP and ESDP. To that 
end, Javier Solana was invited for the first time to inform and 
exchange views with High Officials from the EMP. 
-  The results of the Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Min-
isters of Energy, held in Athens on 20-21 May 2003, were con-
sidered as positive steps for setting the preconditions of regional 
co-operation in the energy sector, as included in a relevant Dec-
laration, but also for promoting co-operation between Israel and 
Palestine. 
-  The launching of a discussion on the Commission’s proposal 
about human rights. 
Rethinking Threat Perceptions 
Euro-Mediterranean politics are full of misunderstandings about distorted 
perceptions and images of Islam, as they are about the threat of terrorism 
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used by transnational extremist groups, especially post-September 11
th. 
Other misperceptions stem from the appropriation of Islam for political 
ends and the tensions arising from questions of universal values and norms 
of human rights. Such misunderstandings emanate as much from mutual 
ignorance, as they do from intended confusion. One should also guard 
against the simplification often suggested in the media that ‘Islamic fun-
damentalism’ is a violent and merciless force orchestrated by radical re-
gimes in the Middle East. The creation of a meaningful (security) partner-
ship in the Mediterranean is no easy task, given the tendency to exploit or 
fuel traditional prejudices that would perpetuate the EMP’s stance between 
order and disorder, making the development of co-operative politics an ‘es-
sentially contested project’. Thus there is urgent need to (re)define terms 
that reduce inter-civilisation dialogue to a series of parallel monologues. 
The aim is for a reciprocal exchange that does away with any subjectivist 
view that wants the ‘West’ to act as a universal civilising force based on an 
almost metaphysical obligation to humanity.  It is, then, of great value that 
any meaningful debate about Islam should dispel the clouds of deliberate 
myth-making and revengeful rhetoric that are detrimental to a security dia-
logue. 
Any security dialogue in the Mediterranean implies a realistic assessment 
of security risks and threats, at both northern and southern fronts. It is true 
that the Arab partners do not present Europe with any major military threat, 
as the growing militarisation in the South is mainly intended for use on a 
south-south scale or for ‘internal interventions’.
15 Nor do southern Mediter-
ranean states perceive any direct threat from the North, for they associate 
‘security’ mainly with domestic concerns and internal policing. Still 
though, even talking about the (neo-colonial) international management of 
domestic crises the West has exhibited post-1989 exacerbates general anti-
Western feelings. A neutral assessment of the risks undermining regional 
stability would not perceive Europe as a threat to the South, as well as 
Europe’s perception over the Islamic danger as an exaggeration. However, 
 
15  T. Dokos, ‘Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean’,    
      Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 2000. 
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it is the threat itself, as much as the dominant perceptions of such threat 
that guide national policy-makers. 
It is commonplace that state behaviour is largely influenced, even deter-
mined, by perceptions. Perceptual influence and mental constructs in politi-
cal interaction becomes visible when actors decide to extend their co-
operation into new areas of collective action. Although terrorist activity is 
endemic in the Mediterranean, most would agree that the new US-
sponsored doctrine focusing on asymmetrical threats and preventive wars 
has impacted on EMP affairs; namely, the re-enforcement of policing in 
national security affairs, an increase in restrictions regarding the free 
movement of people, and the alienation between Mediterranean publics. It 
has also affected the course of Euro-Mediterranean politics, by increasing 
‘internal pressures’ in some southern Mediterranean societies, and by redi-
recting attention to issues of military security at the cost of investing in 
economic growth and stabilisation projects. In particular, there is a domi-
nant perception in the Arab world that
 the US-sponsored antiterrorist cam-
paign in Afghanistan, Iraq and possibly in other parts of the Middle East is 
the beginning of Huntington’s ‘clashing’ era. This perception stems from a 
chain of events that have fuelled the Arab world with a deep sense of inse-
curity. The first Gulf War, the international isolation imposed on Iraq and 
Libya, the overwhelming US preoccupation with Israeli security, and the 
‘neo-hegemonic’ stance of the US before and after the recent war in Iraq 
have convinced the Arabs that the West will not hesitate to strike out 
against them should its interests, geopolitical or other, require so. The de-
velopment of ESDP military capabilities has also led many Arabs to the 
erroneous conclusion that the EU shares NATO’s strategic plan for the 
Mediterranean, focusing primarily on how to combat the new asymmetrical 
threats. All the above endanger the empowerment of radical religious seg-
ments that perceive Europe as a potential enemy. Hence the need for in-
cluding southern EMP partners into ESDP processes. 
Besides the growing feeling that in the Arab world there is a negative pre-
disposition towards the ESDP, questions about the properties of a Mediter-
ranean security system further complicate discussion about the objectives 
and the level of the EU’s strategic involvement in the region. The EU’s of-
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ficial documents such as the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean are 
general descriptions lacking prioritisation over the EU’s strategic inten-
tions.
16 But in the process of consolidating a common European defence 
identity with operational capabilities, the conceptions, intentions, planning, 
political goals, individual national interests of EU states and their attempt 
to maintain a relative diplomatic freedom in the region remain vague. ‘In 
the absence of a clear range of goals, deriving from a joint strategic plan for 
the Mediterranean’, the EuroMeSCo’s report argues that ‘a certain level of 
vagueness is inevitable’.
17 The development of EU military capabilities is a 
reaction to previous European interventions in the successive Yugoslav cri-
ses. But the fact that the main geographical target of the ESDP is to main-
tain peace and stability within the European continent, does not exclude the 
possibility of the EU to undertake humanitarian and crisis-management op-
erations in the Mediterranean.  
The point being made, therefore, is that the ESDP represents a new re-
gional strategic variable, not a threat. Thus the EU’s Mediterranean part-
ners should not perceive it in hostile terms. Immigration is not on the ESDP 
agenda, and the EU’s military force is certainly not intended to act as a po-
lice force for the Mediterranean peoples. Accordingly, the southern part-
ners should not view the deeper motives of the ESDP as the creation of a 
Schengen-type force to guard the Mediterranean, or as some sort of EU 
military imposition or even as an orchestrated western control over them. A 
solid EU position towards the Middle East could act as a confidence-
building measure in Euro-Mediterranean relations, and the ESDP can be 
taken by the Mediterranean partners as a new opportunity to strengthen 
strategic co-operation. 
 
16 The Common Strategy for the Mediterranean was adopted by the Feira Europea-
Council and constitutes a means for accommodating Mediterranean issues to Euro-
pean foreign policy aspirations, as well as a mechanism for implementing CFSP ob-
jectives according to the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.  
17 First Year Report of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) 
Working Group ΙΙΙ, ‘European Defence: Perceptions vs. Realities’, EuroMeSCo 
Papers, No 16, 2002, p. 14. 
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Conclusion 
Current global transformations are sharing and reshaping the terms of po-
litical and economic governance, reactivating basic questions of multilat-
eral co-operation. Deep-seated changes in the conditions of institutionalised 
rule pose new challenges to the search for viable political orders based on 
stable patterns of authority not only within but also between states and so-
cieties. Such challenges offer the broader context within which the integra-
tion of domestic and international politics takes place. At the same time, 
the struggle for social and political equality, the ever widening chasm be-
tween rich and poor, and the displacement of bipolarity by deep divisions 
of cultural values point in the belief that defining elements of separateness 
proceeds hand in hand with the need to identify degrees of common under-
standing among actors that increasingly operate under conditions of com-
plex interdependence. 
Against this swiftly changing international scene, whose intellectual out-
come has been the ascendance of ‘identity politics’ and non-territorial, even 
post-national, forms of governance, the Mediterranean refers to a heterar-
chical regional space, which continues to spark the interest of international 
scholarship. Such composite mosaic of self-images, belief-systems and 
identities results, as noted earlier, in a composite system of partial regimes, 
each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging. The relationship 
between complexity and reality in the region can be understood as having 
developed from a uniquely Mediterranean context. The above views are 
testimony to the enduring influence of cultural distinctiveness in the poli-
tics of regional order-building, with the Mediterranean remaining a divided 
(social) construct. But this renewed interest in Euro-Mediterranean politics 
post-1995 may not necessarily result in a substantive agreement on many 
good governance issues, including transparent policy-making, economic 
security-building, respect for human rights, co-operative conflict manage-
ment and intra-regional reconciliation. Partnership-building and a shared, 
but credible, commitment to mutually rewarding outcomes can feed into 
this process, constituting a crucial adjunct to the emergence of a sense of 
security at the grassroots. Central to the above is the institutionalisation of 
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the EMP through the setting up of co-operative practices, norms and rules. 
All the more so, given the need for an open political dialogue to do away 
with the subjectivist approach that wants the West to act as a universal civi-
lising force based on fixed notions of democracy and a predominantly lib-
eral understanding of political order. 
The Mediterranean has been a crossroads of civilisations as well as a hot-
bed of tension. Today, against the background of unprecedented global 
changes, both its shores are groping for change. At macro-level, although 
the EMP cannot but go ahead through trial and error, it should keep a fun-
damental direction: designing efficient systems of institutionalised rule re-
quires maximum ‘capacity for governance’. The EMP is presently lacking 
such a capacity, not only due to various institutional weaknesses, but also 
due to the absence of credible commitments by the partners to make effec-
tive use of existing arrangements.
18 Notwithstanding the Middle East crisis, 
steps in the right direction include the infusion of greater transparency in its 
structures and a clear focus on strategic co-operation. Most of the EU’s 
southern partners do not oppose the strengthening of regional defence co-
operation and their involvement in joint military exercises, as well as stra-
tegic and training activities. Their participation in future ESDP exercises is 
a valuable confidence-building measure that needs to be encouraged by the 
EU. The reinforcement of scientific as well as military co-operation in 
emergency rescue missions and the handling of natural disasters are good 
cases in point.  
New mechanisms for bilateral security and defence co-operation should not 
be excluded from the agenda, initially at the level information exchange or 
even intelligence sharing at sub-regional level, where security is a clear is-
sue. Such forms of co-operation could then be extended at EMP level for 
the promotion of regional contacts over ESDP matters. Even though south-
ern EMP partners seem to appreciate security and defence co-operation at a 
selective bilateral level, the holding of frequent meetings at Defence Minis-
terial level is desirable by all partners. This  was  made  clear  at  both       
 
18  D. N. Chryssochoou and D. K. Xenakis, ‘Prospects for Euro-Mediterranean Gov-
ernance’, The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2003, pp. 47-70. 
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seminars organised by the Hellenic Presidency of the ESDP that helped to 
revive the interest over the initiation and regularisation of a Mediterranean 
security dialogue. The Greek proposals for the regularisation of such dia-
logue could lead to the institutionalisation of the Mediterranean dimension 
of the ESDP. 
Limited as it may be at present, the potential for organising Mediterranean-
security awaits utilisation. Because crises in the region are endemic, they 
know no borders: they have a tendency to ignore passport procedures and 
spill over very rapidly, opening a wide range of possibilities for crucial 
strategic issues to be brought to the fore. The search for a new legitimacy in 
EMP security structures depends heavily on the partners’ capacity to resist 
the forces of polarisation and segmentation, as well as on the credibility of 
their commitment to a mutually reinforcing dialogue. The flexibility of the 
EMP and the means through which its constitutive norms can facilitate 
agreement on security and defence issues will no doubt affect its potential 
to adjust itself to a highly interdependent region. What is urgently needed is 
a set of system-transforming mechanisms to alleviate regional complexity, 
absorb order-building vibrations and preserve the same sense of being and 
belonging that for centuries now binds the peoples of the region in an al-
most mystical, all-Mediterranean fashion.  
But to break down Mediterranean complexity, one has to realise the impor-
tance of diversity as an essentialistic principle: the system is itself consti-
tuted in the clash of different sub-systems. A heterarchical order minimises 
homogeneity as the principal referent for sub-systemic co-operation. This 
form of enhanced particularity through a reflexive appropriation of differ-
ence becomes the basic normative unit of the system itself. This resonates 
with a broader aspiration of partnership that transcends any mono-
dimensional configuration of power, stressing the complex nature of a 
common vocation. This is where a heterarchical regime like the EMP is 
better equipped to manage the existing levels of regional complexity. The 
plausibility of this claim to the importance of reflexivity, as opposed to co-
ordinated hierarchy, rests on a systemic perspective, whereby the various 
segments form ‘instances of a totality’. Although some hierarchy of norms 
may prove necessary, this should also reflect the necessity for respect for 
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the ‘other’. The aim is for ‘others’ to be brought into the EMP framework, 
and for regional diversity to transform itself from a self-referential property 
of distinct units into an identifiable pluralist order composed of intertwined 
states and societies. 
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